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 “Does Asia need a common currency? My answer is, yes.” Robert Mundell (2003) 
 
Abstract: This paper is a pioneering attempt to include India with east and Southeast 
Asia to study the existence of the economic criteria for a common currency. The analysis 
in this paper shows that significant complementarities in trade exist among these 
countries, most of them experience similar shocks and labor mobility is already present. 
These results point to the fact that the cost of adopting a single currency may be minimal, 
while huge benefits could accrue from enhanced trade. The paper also recognizes the 
importance of yen for the success of the monetary union in Asia.  
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1. Introduction: 
While the last decade witnessed a strong trend towards regional trading blocs, the 
recent success of the euro has also prompted policymakers and academicians to look for 
other optimum currency areas (OCA).  There has been some work done for ASEAN and 
NAFTA (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1994 and Bayoumi and Mauro, 1999), West Africa 
(Masson and Pattillo, 2001) and South Asia (Saxena, 2005). The growth prospects of free 
trade agreement for ASEAN + 3 (China, Japan and South Korea) have also been analyzed 
by Hoa (2002). However, the importance of India’s economic integration with the rest of 
Asia has been conspicuously missing from this literature. Given the geographic location, 
one would expect more economic cooperation among the South Asian economies. The 
analysis of South Asia in Saxena (2005) demonstrates that some of the major economies 
like India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka can form an OCA, using various criteria from the 
literature on OCA. The paper argues that the benefits of a common currency would 
accrue from moving trade from the informal to the formal sector and from the peace that 
economic integration would bring between India and Pakistan.  However, the reluctance 
on the part of Pakistan to solve the Kashmir issue has forced India to look East for 
economic cooperation.  
The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was formed in 1967 with 
five original members, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand. This was expanded to include Brunei Darussalam (1984), Vietnam (1995), 
Laos and Myanmar (1997) and Cambodia (1999). The objectives of this association have 
been to accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the   3
region and to promote regional peace and stability. Over time, ASEAN has made 
significant achievements, which includes increased trade among the ASEAN nations.
2 
The integration of India with ASEAN is highly desirable. In 1992, in a move to 
strengthen its cooperation in an increasingly interdependent world, ASEAN intensified its 
cooperative relationships with its Dialogue Partners, which includes India. This regional 
cooperation is imperative because attempts at sub-regional cooperation like ASEAN and 
SAARC have failed to exploit the full potential of the regional economic integration in 
Asia (Kumar, 2002a). The author argues that this failure is a direct result of limited 
complementarities at the sub-regional levels, but there exist wide range of 
complementarities at pan-Asian level, which could provide for extensive and mutually 
beneficial linkages. In addition, the distinct Asian identity has been shaped by history and 
cultural exchanges over several centuries.
3 In 1997, ASEAN + 3 signed a joint statement 
providing for framework for cooperation towards the 21
st century.
4 Although there needs 
to be significant work done for integration of India with ASEAN + 3, the signing of free 
trade agreement with Singapore and negotiations for free trade with Thailand that are 
underway are promising, to say the least.
5 The recent emphasis by the government of 
India to revive the Silk Route is testimony to the commitment of India to integrate with 
the East (Ved, 2003).  
Asia has lately been working towards demonstrating its own identity to the world. 
In the aftermath of the Asian crisis in 1997, Indonesia, Thailand and South Korea 
resorted to IMF for loans.  However, the problems with the IMF conditionalities led 
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Japan and other Asian countries to propose the formation of the Asian Monetary Fund. 
While this proposal did not go well with the U.S. and the IMF, ASEAN + 3 nonetheless 
have gone ahead with a regional swap agreement (Chiang Mai Initiative) system to deal 
with regional currency crises. The new wave of regionalism (the EU, the NAFTA, 
MERCOSUR, etc) has paved way for Asia to show its supremacy by forming an Asian 
Economic and Monetary Union (AEMU), which according to Baohua (2002) is not a new 
concept but dates back to Confucius 2500 years ago. Recent disagreement within the 
Security Council at the UN regarding war with Iraq has brought out the urgency to give a 
unified front to the United States, which dominates all the international political and 
economic negotiations.
 6 
Due to the recent success of Euro, Asia can even venture to go as far as Europe to 
adopt a single currency. This process requires tremendous amount of political will and 
economic readiness. The aim of this paper is to see if ASEAN + 4 satisfy the economic 
criteria for OCA. Since Mundell’s (1961) and McKinnon’s (1963) seminal work on 
OCA, researchers have focused on four inter-relationships between the countries that 
would impinge on the benefits of adopting a common currency, namely: 
1.  Extent of trade: If potential members of a union trade a lot with each other, monetary 
union would reduce transaction costs. 
2.  Nature of disturbances: If the countries experience similar shocks, the cost of giving 
up monetary policy independence would decrease.  
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3.  Degree of labor mobility: High labor mobility across borders can be a useful 
mechanism for adjusting to asymmetric shocks that lead to high unemployment in a 
subset of the members of the union. 
4.  Fiscal transfers: If region-specific shocks prevail, a federal fiscal system would 
provide regional insurance (in the form of federally funded unemployment insurance 
benefits), thereby attenuating the impact of regional shocks on interregional income 
differentials.  
Using the criteria set out by this literature, this paper looks at the possibility of an 
OCA for the ASEAN + 4 region. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
investigates the basic statistics of the ASEAN+4 countries. Section 3 discusses the 
potential of a currency union for ASEAN+4 using the criteria listed above. Section 4 
concludes.  
 
2. Economic Development of ASEAN, China, India and Korea 
A similar level of economic development is crucial among potential members of a 
currency area in order to facilitate economic integration. A similar average level of 
education, skill and productivity of the work force would help moderate the flow of labor 
across borders, which could otherwise put social and fiscal strains on the immigrant 
country.
7 Entry into a monetary union leaves fiscal policy as the only macroeconomic 
tool for stabilization purposes. Therefore, fiscal policy should not be unduly strained by 
differences in social and economic structures. Table 1 illustrates economic and social 
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indicators of ASEAN5, China, India and Korea for the year 1999.
8 The year 1999 was 
chosen so that sufficient time had elapsed since the Asian crisis and to exclude the global 
recession, which started in 2000. It can be seen from the table that the majority of the 
population is in the working age group. The ASEAN5 and China, Korea and India 
preclude aging as a major problem in the near future, which could put undue pressure on 
fiscal resources and threaten the existence of the union.  
Economic indicators for India are comparable to those of ASEAN5 (Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand), China and Korea. The services sector 
constitutes about 48% of GDP for India, which is in line with other economies’ services 
sector. A similar economic structure may make them vulnerable to similar economic 
shocks, which strengthens the argument to use common currency.
9 All these economies 
are sufficiently open, with trade contributing to at least one-fourth of GDP. The more 
open an economy, the greater will be the benefits that would accrue from elimination of 
exchange rate risks by using the same currency.
10  
The social indicator that distinguishes India from the ASEAN5, China and Korea 
is (il)literacy. While Korea has found its niche in building brand names like Samsung, 
Hyundai and LG and Singapore has decided to offer world class infrastructure, India has 
decided to invest in intellectual services (Economic Times, 2003). Hence, India’s 
comparative advantage in these intellectual services complements with the rest of the 
region. 
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Solid macroeconomic policies and performances are also required for countries in 
a potential monetary union in order to prevent a poor performer from imposing 
externalities on the union. All budget and current account balances are either in surplus or 
small deficits. Short- term debt (as a % of total external debt) is less than 25% for all 
countries, except for Korea (27%). The present value of debt is also sustainable. A 
burgeoning external debt may pose a significant cost to the union by increasing sovereign 
default risk and widening interest rate spreads. 
Comparing ASEAN + 4 with other geographic regions 
    Table 2 illustrates the mean and standard deviation of growth and inflation. 
ASEAN has an average growth rate of 5.5% and inflation of 16%. This high average 
inflation is mainly due to high inflation in Lao People’s Democratic Republic (37%) and 
Indonesia (63%).
11 When we exclude these countries, the average inflation declines to 
6.8%. The average growth rate for China, India, Japan and Korea is 6% (mainly due to 
high rates of growth in China (7%) and Korea (8%)), while the average inflation is 7.7%. 
The average growth rate is higher for ASEAN+4 and inflation lower than for ASEAN. In 
addition, the variability in inflation rates is also reduced. While ASEAN+4 show much 
higher growth and inflation rates than Western Europe, the variability is also higher.  
Although stability of growth and inflation is important, a positive correlation of 
growth and inflation for the ASEAN5+4 nations (Table 3) would suggest that the 
countries may be cyclically synchronized. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) find some 
country groups with positive correlation for output but not inflation in case of Western 
Europe. According to these correlations, 77% of the correlations in output growth rates 
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and 70% of the inflation correlations are positive for ASEAN5 + 4. These positive 
correlations may suggest synchronized business cycles. However, we will analyze the 
correlation of demand and supply shocks to explore this matter further in the next section.  
 
3. Is ASEAN+4 an Optimal Currency Area? 
Criterion 1: Trade 
The literature on OCA emphasizes trade as the main channel through which 
benefits from a common currency will be enjoyed (Frankel and Rose, 2000). Hence, if 
countries trade a lot with each other, they are likely to benefit from low transaction costs 
and elimination of exchange rate risks. Rose (1999) finds that two countries that share the 
same currency trade three times as much as they would with different currencies. Glick 
and Rose (2001) find that bilateral trade rises/falls by about 100% as a pair of countries 
forms/dissolves a currency union, ceteris paribus. Rose and Engel (2002) find that 
members of international currency unions tend to experience more trade and less volatile 
exchange rates. It is not clear if trade is a pre-requisite for forming a currency union or 
vice versa. The two are endogenous decisions and hence, suffer from the famous Lucas 
Critique. Nonetheless, it would be helpful to see if these countries could potentially gain 
from lower transaction costs if they were to move to a single currency.      
Figure 1 illustrates intra-ASEAN trade, which for almost all countries has risen 
over time. The average trade for the latest period (1991-2000) varies from as low as 12% 
for the Philippines to about 60% for Lao People’s Democratic Republic. Figure 2 shows 
that Chinese, Japanese, Korean and Indian trade with ASEAN has gone up from 1950s to   9
2000. The average trade with ASEAN during 1991-2000 is about 7% for China, 8% for 
India, 11% for Korea and 15% for Japan.
12  
While present levels of trade of China, India, Japan and Korea with ASEAN are 
small, there exists potential for trade among the ASEAN + 4 countries, which is 
calculated using the COS measure, developed by Linnemann (1966). This index measures 
the degree of commodity correspondence between the exports of a country and the 
imports of another country. It varies between zero (no similarity or correspondence at all) 
and one (perfect similarity) and is the cosine of the angle between the vector of country i 
exports and the vector of country j imports in an n-dimensional commodity space. If the 
subscripts i, j and k refer to the exporting country, importing country and commodity 
















This measure has been estimated for SAARC countries in Panchmukhi (1990) and 
for various developing and developed countries in Beers and Linnemann (1992). Table 4 
(a through h) depict the COS measures for India, Korea, China and Japan from 1996 
through 2000 for 5-digit SITC codes. The data is taken from PC-TAS.
13 Indian primary 
exports (industries 0-4) exhibit significant complementarity with all the countries (Table 
4a), while goods similar to the Indian manufactured exports (industries 5-8) are imported 
by all countries except Korea. Indian manufactured imports (Table 4b) are 
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complementary to all the countries’ exports, while Indian imports of primary products are 
similar to the exports of Japan, Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines. Korean 
primary exports are similar to the imports for all except Malaysia and Indonesia (Table 
4c), while manufactured exports are complementary to the imports of all countries.  All 
the Korean imports are similar to the exports by all countries, except for all goods for 
Thailand and manufactured products for Indonesia (Table 4d). Chinese exports and 
imports of both primary and manufactured goods are complementary to the imports and 
exports by all the countries (Table 4e and 4f). All of Japan’s exports are complementary 
to the imports of all countries, except primary imports of Philippines (Table 4g). The 
COS measure shows complementarities for all of Japanese imports (Table 4h).     
The existence of significant complementarities but low current bilateral trade 
testifies to the gains that can accrue from free trade zones and the eventual use of a 
common currency. When country A exports good k to the world and country B imports 
the same good from a third country, even when the unit cost of this good from importing 
it from country A is lower, is termed as cost of non-cooperation. According to Das 
(2002), if the existing trade complementarities are exploited between India and Thailand, 
India could save around $4.6b and Thailand $7.9b in imports expenditures, which 
represent about 10% and 14% of the total import expenditures, respectively. These are 
enormous costs that can be eliminated through free trade and common currency.  
This emphasis on trade is worthwhile because trade enhances growth. Frankel and 
Romer (1999) show that trade has a quantitatively large and robust positive effect on 
income. Frankel and Rose (2000) argue that currency unions stimulate trade, which in 
turn boosts output. Frankel, Romer and Cyrus (1996) suggest strong growth effects of   11
trade on East Asian economies. All the papers that study the impact of trade on growth 
use gravity model. Hoa (2002) extends the gravity model to time series and estimates the 
effects of ASEAN trade with China, Japan and Korea on ASEAN growth using two-stage 
least squares. He finds that trade between ASEAN and each of the three East Asian 
economies has significant and positive effect on ASEAN growth. We estimate the same 
model for the impact of India’s trade with ASEAN on ASEAN growth for the period 
1960-2000. The results obtained are: 
(2) 
97 * 06 . 0 79 * 03 . 0                                   
67 * 03 . 0 _ _ * 38 . 3 04 . 0 _
DUM DUM




where all coefficients are significant at 1% level of significance. The estimates 
indicate positive and highly significant effect of ASEAN trade with India and the 
formation of ASEAN (DUM67) on ASEAN output growth. The results also show 
negative impacts of the second oil shock (DUM79) and the Asian crisis (DUM97) on 
ASEAN output growth. Hence, these results along with Hoa (2002) results reveal the 
positive impact of Chinese, Indian, Japanese and Korean trade with ASEAN on ASEAN 
growth. Since trade has positive impact on growth and common currency encourages 
trade, hence there is a strong case for a common currency for this region. 
 
Criterion 2: Patterns of Shocks 
Using the methodology outlined by Blanchard and Quah (1989) and Bayoumi 
(1992) (described in Appendix 1), we estimate the structural vector autoregression (VAR)   12
model on annual data for ASEAN8 plus China, India, Japan and Korea (see Appendix 2 
for data sources).
14 The estimated results are presented in tables 5 and 6.
15 
Our main interest in this empirical exercise is to extract the supply and demand 
shocks.  A positive correlation of supply shocks signals that countries would require a 
synchronous policy response, which is crucial as the countries entering the union have to 
accept a common monetary policy. Highly related demand shocks may be less important, 
as they may stem from divergent monetary policies, which would no longer occur after 
the monetary union. Tables 5a and 5b report the correlation of supply and demand 
shocks among the ASEAN + 4 countries. While the estimated correlation coefficients of 
supply shocks ranged between –0.39 and 0.68 for Western Europe, –0.59 and 0.72 for 
the Americas (Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994)) and –0.41 and 0.29 for South Asia 
(Saxena 2005), the correlation coefficients for ASEAN + 4 range between-0.002 and 
0.857. Indeed, 73% of the correlations for supply shocks are positive, indicating that they 
might be suitable candidates for an OCA. 
The correlation coefficients for demand shocks ranged from -0.21 to 0.65 for 
Western Europe, –0.45 to 0.7 for the Americas (Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994)) and –
0.3 to 0.57 for South Asia (Saxena 2005). The range for ASEAN+4 is –0.017 and 0.603 
and about half of the correlations are positive. 
Size of disturbances and speed of adjustment: The typical size of disturbances 
is another important economic characteristic since larger disturbances can have very 
disruptive effects, and may require policy independence (e.g., monetary policy) to offset 
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15 In order to conserve space, variance decompositions and impulse response functions are not shown here 
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them. Similarly, if the speed with which the economies adjust to disturbances is slow, 
then the cost of fixing the exchange rate and losing policy autonomy increases (Saxena, 
2005).  
In order to assess the size of disturbances, we use the long-run effect on output 
from the impulse response functions for the size of supply shocks and the sum of the first 
year’s impact on output and prices for the demand shocks. For the speed of adjustment, 
we estimate the response after two years as a share of the long run effect (following 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994)). 
Table 6 displays the size and the speed of adjustment for supply and demand 
disturbances for different geographic regions. While the size of the supply and the 
demand disturbances for ASEAN + 4 is larger than that of Western Europe, the speed of 
adjustment is significantly faster. Within the ASEAN + 4 region, the size of the supply 
disturbances is smallest in India and largest in Japan. At least 75% of the adjustment from 
supply shock is completed within two years for all countries, except Japan. But Japan and 
Malaysia have the smallest and Indonesia the largest demand disturbances. While India 
and Singapore seem to adjust fastest to demand shocks, Vietnam takes the longest time. 
Since demand disturbances may not be so important after the entry into the union, this 
might not be a hindrance. However, Japan’s extremely slow adjustment to supply shocks 
could be problematic. This might also be reflective of the decade long recession in Japan. 
As we argue in the concluding section, the slow Japanese recovery might gain 
momentum from this regional integration.    14
 
Criterion 3: Labor Mobility  
Labor mobility has been emphasized in the optimum currency area literature as it 
helps the members of a monetary union to adjust to asymmetric shocks by allowing labor 
to move from areas of high unemployment to low unemployment. The objective of the 
integrated human resource development strategy for ASEAN is “to enhance labor 
mobility by way of skills upgrading, re-tooling, training in new skills, a system of 
recognition of skill certificates and credentials within and among countries in the ASEAN 
region. To this end, the Hanoi Plan of Action adopted by the ASEAN summit in 
December 1998 called for the establishment of networks of professionals, accreditation 
bodies and mutual recognition of technical and professional credentials and skill 
standards beginning in 1999.”
16 By 2001, ASEAN Occupational Safety and Health 
Network (ASEAN-OSHNET) was launched and the ASEAN committee of civil service 
commissions is now included in the ASEAN institutional framework.
17  
The size and direction of labor mobility and the quality of labor migration has 
varied across countries. While Singapore has historically depended on unskilled migrant 
labor, ethnically homogenous Japan and, to a lesser extent, Korea had practiced tight 
labor controls on in-migration until very recently. On the one hand, Philippines and 
Vietnam have a long history of exporting labor; on the other hand, Thailand and Malaysia 
already experience a huge inflow of illegal immigrants. Malaysia imports most labor 
from Indonesia, while Thailand is a major source of destination of economic and political 
refugees from Myanmar in the 1990s (Manning, 2000). In any event, intra-Asian 
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migration has increased from one million at the beginning of the 1980s to 6.5 million in 
1997. Major host countries include Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan, and major 
exporters are Indonesia and the Philippines. Korea, Malaysia and Thailand are both 
exporters and importers of migrant workers (Kwack, 2004). While Kwack believes that 
this increased migration within Asian countries has been closely associated with 
increased inter-regional trade and investment, Manning attributes the high migration of 
the 1990s to increased growth in the region and low growth of labor due to falling 
fertility rates in the 1970s and 1980s leading to tighter labor markets. Manning argues 
that while the movement of unskilled labor has predominated, skilled, professional and 
business migration has also intensified. This trend has continued even in the face of the 
Asian crisis. 
Labor mobility is difficult to measure. However, Masson and Taylor (1993) 
assume that if migration is for employment then mobility will result in lower 
unemployment rate differentials across regions and over time. Table 7 compares 
dispersion of unemployment rates across regions covering the period from 1980-2000. 
The average dispersion is smallest for East and South East Asia (1.23) and largest for the 
EU (2.06). If our assumption is correct, labor mobility is highest in Asia, which is 
required if countries decide to go in for a single currency.  
In short, labor mobility is already reasonably high within the Asian region. This 
can be given a boost through the Hanoi Plan of Action. In fact, Sussangkarn (1997) 
argues that the incentives for labor mobility are enhanced by the fact that intra-ASEAN 
trade is much smaller than the intra-EU trade. Consequently, adjustment to shocks can be 
accomplished through labor mobility.   16
 
Criterion 4: Fiscal Transfers 
The issue of fiscal federalism has been widely discussed in the literature on 
currency areas. Currently, Asia does not have any transfer of fiscal resources from one 
country to another, but something along the lines of EU
18 can be discussed later in the 
negotiations. The Chiang-Mai Initiative is a step in the right direction to help countries in 
times of crisis.  
However, Eichengreen (1997) and Fatas (1998) have argued against fiscal 
federalism. Eichengreen feels that it may discourage factor mobility and may encourage 
national labor unions to demand higher wages as the burden of unemployment benefits 
falls on the entire union (and this may create more socially inefficient unemployment). 
Fatas believes that the potential to provide interregional insurance through (European) 
fiscal federalism is too small to compensate for the problems associated with its design 
and implementation.   
 
4. Conclusions 
This paper is a pioneering attempt to include India with east and Southeast Asia to 
study the existence of the economic criteria for a currency union in Asia. The analysis in 
this paper shows that Chinese, Japanese, Indian and Korean trade with ASEAN has risen 
in the last decade and this increase in trade has a positive impact on ASEAN growth. 
There are significant complementarities in the trade structure too, which suggest that 
these countries should work towards a Common Market. Labor is already mobile across 
the region and can help facilitate adjustment to shocks. The positive correlations for 
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supply shocks testify that the loss from giving up independent monetary policy would be 
minimal. However, the slow adjustment of Japanese economy might suggest a threat to 
the union. But if Japan’s idle capacity in construction industry can be utilized by other 
countries, say like India, Japan’s recovery could be faster. These complementarities can 
be quickly exploited if Asia decides to deepen its monetary and financial cooperation.  
What should the new currency look like? Against which currency should Asian 
nations peg their exchange rates? It was not until the 1980s that the Deutschemark was 
acknowledged as the anchor currency. While Europe had institutional, economic and 
political groundwork already laid out, like the Common Market and later the Economic 
Community, which facilitated the move to a single currency, Asia lacks this foundation. 
However, Mundell (2003) argues that Asia could leap frog to a currency area if the 
potential members are willing to use an internal or external currency anchors. Internal 
anchor in the form of yen would be desirable but huge fluctuations in the yen-dollar 
exchange rates would be disastrous for the other economies. Hence, a stable yen-dollar 
exchange rate can go a long way in promoting the idea of a common currency in Asia.    
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Appendix 1: Empirical methodology to study demand and supply shocks 
Although structural vector autogressions are very standard in the literature, yet we 
will describe this methodology. In order to examine the nature of the shocks affecting the 
ASEAN, China, India, Japan and Korea, we employ the procedure developed by 
Blanchard and Quah (1989) and extended by Bayoumi (1992) to identify demand and 
supply shocks affecting real GNP. In Blanchard-Quah’s model, demand side shocks have 
no long run effect on output, due to the natural rate hypothesis, while productivity shocks 
have a permanent effect on output. Since there is no unique way to decompose the series 
in a univariate framework, Blanchard and Quah use output and unemployment in their 
VAR to decompose real GNP. Bayoumi (1992) develops a similar model but uses prices 
instead of unemployment. He argues that since unemployment would be expected to 
move in the same way in response to both demand and supply shocks, the implied over-
identifying restrictions would have somewhat less power than if prices are used. 
The basic framework is as follows.
19 Suppose the true model can be represented 
by an infinite moving average of a (vector) of variables  Xt  and an equal number of 
shocks εt (where L is the lag operator and A represents a matrix of impulse response 
functions of the shocks to the elements of X).  
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Bayoumi (1992) uses output and prices in estimating supply and demand shocks. 
The framework implies that while supply shocks have permanent effects on the level of 
output, demand shocks have only temporary effects (both have permanent effects on the 
level of prices). Let  Xt  consist of a change in real output and a change in prices. Let εt 









































    





where  ε ε st dt  and   are independent supply and demand shocks. In theory, only supply 
shocks affect real output in the long run, while demand shocks have only a temporary 
effect.  Since real output is written in first-difference form, the cumulative effect of 
demand shocks on the change in real output must be zero. This puts the following 
restriction on the model: 
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Since the elements of X are covariance stationary (represented by the infinite 
moving average process in 1), they can be represented by an autoregressive process by 
inverting the MA operator. Hence, this model can be estimated using a vector auto 
regression (VAR), where all the variables are potentially endogenous and hence are 
regressed on their lags. Let B represent the estimated coefficients, the VAR can be 
written as: 
(4) 
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where et represents the residuals from the equations in the VAR. 
                                                 
19 See Blanchard and Quah (1989), Bayoumi (1992) and Enders (1995) for details on this framework.    23
In order to transform equation (4) into the model defined by (2) and (3), we need 
to transform the residuals from VAR (et) into supply and demand (εt). Writing et=Cεt, 
in this two by two case, we require four restrictions to define the four elements of the 
matrix C. Two restrictions come from normalization of the variance of supply and 
demand shocks. Another one comes from orthogonality of the two structural shocks.  
The final restriction comes from the fact that demand shocks have only temporary 
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This restriction allows the matrix C to be uniquely defined and the supply and demand 
shocks to be identified.  
This econometric methodology is used to estimate supply and demand shocks. 
Then, a pair-wise correlation matrix is computed for each type of shock to examine their 
symmetry across countries, which is essential in determining the readiness of a country to 
enter the union. A positive correlation of supply shocks signals that countries would 
require a synchronous policy response, which is crucial as the countries entering the 
union have to accept a common monetary policy. Highly related demand shocks may be 
less important, as they may stem from divergent monetary policies, which would no 
longer occur after monetary union. 
 
Country Source Series No. of Obs. Estimation Prd
China,P.R.: Mainland IFTS 92464...ZF... CPI (UNPUBLISHED) 20 1981-2000
China,P.R.: Mainland IFTS 92499B.PZF... GDP AT 1995 PRICES
India IFTS 53464...ZF... CPI:INDUST.WORKERS,50 CENTERS 42 1959-2000
India IFTS 53499BVPZF... GDP VOL. (1995=100)
Indonesia            IFTS 53664...ZF... CPI:17 CAPITAL CITIES 41 1961-2001
Indonesia            IFTS 53699BVPZF... GDP VOL. (1995=100)
Japan WEO W158NGDP_R Gross domestic product, constant prices 47 1955-2001
Japan                IFTS 15864...ZF... CPI:ALL JAPAN-485 ITEMS
Korea                IFTS 54264...ZF... CPI ALL CITIES 36 1966-2001
Korea                IFTS 54299BVPZF... GDP VOL. (1995=100)
Lao People's Dem.Rep IFTS 54464...ZF... CONSUMER PRICE INDEX 36 1966-2001
Lao People's Dem.Rep WEO W544NGDP_R Gross domestic product, constant prices
Malaysia WEO W548NGDP_R Gross domestic product, constant prices 37 1965-2001
Malaysia             IFTS 54864...ZF... CPI PENINSULAR MALAYSIA
p Myanmar WEO W518NGDP_R Gross domestic product, constant prices 36 1966-2001
Myanmar              IFTS 51864...ZF... CPI RANGOON ALL INCOME
Philippines IFTS 56664...ZF... CPI:ALL INC H'HLDS-459 ITEMS 41 1961-2001
Philippines IFTS 56699BVPZF... GDP VOL. (1995=100)
Singapore            IFTS 57664...ZF... CPI 39 1963-2001
Singapore            IFTS 57699BVPZF... GDP VOL. (1995=100)
Thailand             IFTS 57864...ZF... CPI: URBAN 46 1956-2001
Thailand             IFTS 57899BVPZF... GDP VOL. (1995=100)
Vietnam IFTS 58264...ZF... CONSUMER PRICES 1995=100 36 1966-2001
Vietnam WEO W582NGDP_R Gross domestic product, constant prices
Appendix 2: Data Source for Estimating Structural Vector Autoregressions
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China Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand India
GDP growth rate 7.05 0.85 10.89 6.08 3.40 5.86 4.22 7.10
GDP per capita (PPP $) 3643 2892 15878 8107 3806 20874 6135 2258
Value Added: Agriculture (% of GDP) 17.63 19.54 5.07 11.91 17.15 0.15 11.20 26.23
Value Added: Manufacturing (% of GDP) 33.63 25.92 30.74 29.32 21.63 25.07 31.10 15.20
Value Added: Services (% of GDP) 32.95 36.71 52.41 45.47 52.25 65.21 49.51 47.75
Infant Mortality Rate 32.00 40.88 8.16 7.90 30.72 2.90 27.92 69.2
Life Expectancy at birth 70.26 66.03 73.15 72.54 69.27 77.65 68.82 62.80
Illiteracy rate (adult) 16.59 13.79 2.41 13.16 4.96 8.04 4.79 43.55
Immunization, DPT  90 71.5 74 93 79 94 97 55
I m m u n i z a t i o n ,  M e a s l e s 9 07 18 58 87 9 9 39 65 0
Population (0-14) (% of total)  25.10 31.25 21.29 34.46 37.85 21.73 27.07 33.87
Population (15-64) (% of total)  67.97 64.03 71.78 61.45 58.51 70.34 67.93 61.28
Rural population (% of total population)  68.44 60.16 18.84 43.34 42.32 0.00 78.72 71.92
Population density (per sq km)  134.40 114.28 474.61 69.12 248.83 6478.69 117.92 335.50
CPI inflation -1.41 20.49 0.81 2.74 6.71 0.02 0.31 4.67
Budget balance (% of GDP)  -2.13 -1.14 -3.21 -1.76 -3.75 10.26 -3.34 -4.24
Current account  (% of GDP)  2.13 4.09 6.03 15.95 10.39 25.94 10.18 -1.14
Trade (% of GDP)  41.19 62.36 77.82 218.26 102.78 313.59 104.30 27.01
Short-term debt (% of total external debt)  11.47 13.28 26.66 14.35 10.84 n.a. 24.20 4.01
PV of debt (% of exports )  45.52 181.78 60.56 37.87 102.78 n.a. 88.96 91.21
Aid (% of GNI)  0.24 1.69 -0.01 0.19 0.86 0.00 0.85 0.34
FDI, net inflows (% of GDP)  3.91 -1.94 2.30 1.96 0.75 8.58 5.09 0.49
Taxes on trade (% of current revenue)  9.51 2.54 6.39 12.66 18.27 1.32 9.22 20.76
International reserves (months of imports)  9.09 6.09 5.84 4.44 4.55 7.01 6.69 5.96
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank, CD-Rom, except for budget deficits, which is from IMF IFS, 2002; Values for infant mortality,  
life expectancy and PV of debt are for the year 2000; shaded values are for 1997; n.a. represents non-availability of data; data for budget deficits is from IMF IFS 2002.
Table 1: Economic Structure of ASEAN + 3 Countries: 1999
Growth and Economic Structure
Social Indicators
Internal and External Balance
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Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Brunei 2.45 7.89
Cambodia 5.13 3.10 5.39 5.91
Indonesia 5.72 4.30 62.69 183.70
Lao 5.63 3.73 36.50 38.28
Malaysia 6.89 3.54 3.43 3.35
Myanmar 3.89 5.19 12.88 13.69
Philippines 3.88 3.28 10.72 8.91
Singapore 8.53 4.01 2.96 4.68
Thailand 6.88 4.03 5.31 5.17
Vietnam 6.40 2.18 3.71 3.40
China 7.11 7.53 8.72 8.33
India 4.58 3.17 8.11 5.62
Japan 5.13 3.85 4.44 4.42
Korea 7.66 3.80 9.70 7.23
Averages
ASEAN 5.54 4.12 15.95 29.68
ASEAN5 6.38 3.83 17.02 41.16
Chn, Ind, Jpn, Kor 6.12 4.59 7.74 6.98
ASEAN+4 5.71 4.26 13.43 22.51
European Union 3.44 2.55 7.17 5.22
NAFTA 3.86 2.67 12.02 12.80
SAARC 5.44 3.18 8.70 5.28
Latin America 3.36 4.58 206.33 595.91
Data is from 1961-2000 for all (with some exceptions)
Data Source: World Development Indicators CD-Rom, World Bank
Growth Inflation
Table 2: Basic Statistics of ASEAN + 4 and other
Geographic Regions
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China Indonesia India Japan Korea Malaysia Phillippines Singapore Thailand
China 1
Indonesia 0.036 1
India 0.083 -0.037 1
Japan -0.217 0.512 -0.101 1
Korea 0.115 0.538 -0.014 0.057 1
Malaysia -0.051 0.838 -0.071 0.293 0.517 1
Phillippines -0.554 0.260 0.106 0.188 0.106 0.425 1
Singapore -0.185 0.617 0.027 0.212 0.293 0.857 0.557 1
Thailand 0.064 0.802 0.110 0.439 0.697 0.752 0.243 0.552 1





China Indonesia India Japan Korea Malaysia Phillippines Singapore Thailand
China 1
Indonesia -0.250 1
India 0.073 0.167 1
Japan -0.349 0.169 0.304 1
Korea -0.288 0.221 0.149 0.645 1
Malaysia -0.070 -0.181 0.643 0.603 0.269 1
Phillippines -0.004 -0.210 0.327 0.377 0.156 0.489 1
Singapore -0.083 -0.030 0.678 0.678 0.307 0.876 0.487 1
Thailand -0.008 -0.098 0.567 0.594 0.398 0.870 0.373 0.845 1
Table 3b: Correlations of Inflation Rates Among ASEAN5 + 4 Nations
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Imports from 1996 1997 1998 1999 Average
Thailand ALL 0.161 0.106 0.085 0.090 0.113
Ind 0 0.604 0.648 0.620 0.619 0.655
Ind 2 0.107 0.139 0.262 0.155 0.157
Ind 5 0.369 0.454 0.360 0.450 0.421
Ind 6 0.394 0.235 0.178 0.175 0.269
Ind 7 0.600 0.462 0.208 0.322 0.436
Ind 8 0.135 0.113 0.093 0.131 0.127
China ALL 0.090 0.101 0.066 0.057 0.076
Ind 0 0.678 0.576 0.359 0.500 0.579
Ind 2 0.113 0.092 0.126 0.201 0.155
Ind 5 0.107 0.110 0.106 0.178 0.148
Ind 6 0.107 0.125 0.096 0.100 0.115
Ind 7 0.423 0.424 0.320 0.347 0.409
Ind 8 0.108 0.114 0.114 0.150 0.140
Singapore ALL 0.086 0.070 0.039 0.043 0.055
Ind 0 0.526 0.522 0.586 0.503 0.550
Ind 2 0.496 0.476 0.476 0.291 0.338
Ind 5 0.406 0.388 0.372 0.416 0.403
Ind 6 0.548 0.493 0.296 0.455 0.480
Ind 7 0.504 0.342 0.197 0.249 0.324
Ind 8 0.374 0.426 0.314 0.368 0.401
Japan ALL 0.252 0.208 0.177 0.162 0.183
Ind 0 0.478 0.539 0.429 0.536 0.502
Ind 2 0.294 0.251 0.333 0.291 0.306
Ind 5 0.523 0.522 0.472 0.515 0.522
Ind 6 0.478 0.346 0.322 0.370 0.370
Ind 7 0.452 0.318 0.238 0.274 0.322
Ind 8 0.444 0.410 0.439 0.459 0.450
Koea ALL 0.058 0.040 0.019 0.020 0.032
Ind 0 0.512 0.456 0.350 0.324 0.423
Ind 2 0.071 0.067 0.040 0.042 0.058
Ind 5 0.231 0.222 0.216 0.273 0.246
Ind 6 0.116 0.113 0.071 0.082 0.101
Ind 7 0.328 0.165 0.100 0.109 0.184
Ind 8 0.144 0.159 0.110 0.161 0.155
Indonesia ALL 0.292 0.166 0.485 0.375 0.332
Ind 0 0.722 0.359 0.810 0.584 0.702
Ind 2 0.383 0.507 0.182 0.301 0.355
Ind 5 0.179 0.187 0.137 0.205 0.178
Ind 6 0.132 0.163 0.211 0.276 0.210
Ind 7 0.473 0.535 0.442 0.521 0.577
Ind 8 0.136 0.123 0.094 0.079 0.117
Phillippines ALL 0.090 0.071 0.093 0.053 0.072
Ind 0 0.715 0.729 0.931 0.720 0.802
Ind 2 0.293 0.468 0.212 0.326 0.333
Ind 5 0.425 0.448 0.596 0.640 0.548
Ind 6 0.155 0.184 0.225 0.219 0.200
Ind 7 0.258 0.215 0.122 0.132 0.185
Ind 8 0.121 0.106 0.093 0.112 0.110
Malaysia ALL 0.046 0.041 0.023 0.017 0.028
Ind 0 0.499 0.502 0.533 0.380 0.479
Ind 2 0.335 0.363 0.327 0.224 0.295
Ind 5 0.399 0.411 0.340 0.416 0.406
Ind 6 0.164 0.123 0.083 0.082 0.117
Ind 7 0.307 0.270 0.136 0.136 0.215
Ind 8 0.106 0.076 0.071 0.092 0.083
Brunei ALL n.a. 0.185 0.075 n.a. 0.163
Ind 0 n.a. 0.657 0.067 n.a. 0.520
Ind 5 n.a. 0.435 0.677 n.a. 0.549
Ind 6 n.a. 0.383 0.329 n.a. 0.386
Ind 7 n.a. 0.236 0.268 n.a. 0.265
Ind 8 n.a. 0.203 0.087 n.a. 0.172
Table 4a: COS Measure for India's Exports
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Exports of  1996 1997 1998 1999 Average
Thailand ALL 0.076 0.132 0.110 0.094 0.101
Ind 0 0.014 0.147 0.147 0.127 0.146
Ind 2 0.035 0.067 0.080 0.071 0.066
Ind 5 0.364 0.452 0.527 0.524 0.529
Ind 6 0.071 0.068 0.069 0.075 0.082
Ind 7 0.344 0.467 0.549 0.655 0.542
Ind 8 0.233 0.194 0.228 0.198 0.213
China ALL 0.092 0.078 0.062 0.073 0.079
Ind 0 0.101 0.149 0.110 0.088 0.140
Ind 2 0.116 0.140 0.140 0.118 0.130
Ind 5 0.232 0.235 0.190 0.188 0.221
Ind 6 0.050 0.053 0.055 0.053 0.059
Ind 7 0.430 0.542 0.629 0.663 0.603
Ind 8 0.198 0.176 0.180 0.196 0.193
Singapore ALL 0.099 0.105 0.136 0.091 0.099
Ind 0 0.120 0.095 0.133 0.103 0.111
Ind 2 0.208 0.292 0.354 0.283 0.300
Ind 5 0.339 0.416 0.432 0.302 0.422
Ind 6 0.168 0.127 0.097 0.078 0.112
Ind 7 0.372 0.491 0.560 0.586 0.514
Ind 8 0.525 0.548 0.524 0.723 0.669
Japan ALL 0.262 0.166 0.117 0.147 0.158
Ind 0 0.687 0.245 0.088 0.104 0.176
Ind 2 0.457 0.427 0.413 0.433 0.452
Ind 5 0.299 0.254 0.209 0.185 0.240
Ind 6 0.298 0.306 0.260 0.230 0.300
Ind 7 0.556 0.661 0.708 0.731 0.696
Ind 8 0.184 0.136 0.175 0.125 0.138
Korea ALL 0.309 0.386 0.395 0.230 0.314
Ind 0 0.144 0.555 0.804 0.705 0.722
Ind 2 0.140 0.148 0.126 0.086 0.129
Ind 5 0.398 0.292 0.244 0.221 0.296
Ind 6 0.117 0.145 0.184 0.160 0.172
Ind 7 0.320 0.403 0.394 0.512 0.468
Ind 8 0.186 0.159 0.142 0.100 0.177
Indonesia ALL 0.123 0.154 0.224 0.240 0.197
Ind 0 0.063 0.066 0.078 0.098 0.085
Ind 2 0.044 0.074 0.080 0.072 0.075
Ind 4 0.534 0.674 0.750 0.875 0.746
Ind 5 0.677 0.627 0.342 0.297 0.545
Ind 6 0.055 0.054 0.101 0.098 0.097
Ind 7 0.262 0.414 0.567 0.685 0.537
Ind 8 0.175 0.138 0.166 0.097 0.161
Philippines ALL 0.140 0.087 0.040 0.041 0.058
Ind 0 0.018 0.361 0.414 0.329 0.310
Ind 2 0.388 0.511 0.560 0.546 0.534
Ind 5 0.125 0.449 0.418 0.390 0.396
Ind 6 0.690 0.600 0.232 0.191 0.463
Ind 7 0.196 0.232 0.179 0.172 0.196
Ind 8 0.171 0.146 0.136 0.133 0.147
Malaysia ALL 0.119 0.115 0.122 0.116 0.119
Ind 0 0.209 0.325 0.399 0.423 0.424
Ind 2 0.220 0.395 0.341 0.512 0.379
Ind 4 0.968 0.977 0.940 0.955 0.963
Ind 5 0.376 0.212 0.128 0.121 0.213
Ind 6 0.012 0.012 0.015 0.012 0.013
Ind 7 0.230 0.375 0.458 0.619 0.486
Ind 8 0.187 0.146 0.137 0.161 0.170
Brunei ALL n.a. 0.235 0.368 n.a. 0.282
Table 4b: COS Measure for India's Imports
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Imports from 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Average
China ALL 0.252 0.298 0.352 0.439 0.555 0.422
Ind 0 0.111 0.070 0.111 0.204 0.233 0.151
Ind 2 0.636 0.677 0.558 0.434 0.366 0.532
Ind 3 0.218 0.236 0.884 0.763 0.068 0.766
Ind 5 0.602 0.649 0.690 0.747 0.830 0.740
Ind 6 0.609 0.626 0.635 0.671 0.643 0.660
Ind 7 0.238 0.306 0.333 0.450 0.577 0.434
Ind 8 0.270 0.298 0.312 0.357 0.420 0.377
Japan ALL 0.627 0.616 0.591 0.702 0.808 0.707
Ind 0 0.493 0.475 0.524 0.603 0.447 0.527
Ind 2 0.095 0.097 0.101 0.122 0.116 0.106
Ind 3 0.033 0.032 0.680 0.678 0.640 0.683
Ind 5 0.222 0.235 0.249 0.231 0.222 0.236
Ind 6 0.129 0.158 0.182 0.132 0.114 0.147
Ind 7 0.799 0.792 0.726 0.823 0.911 0.848
Ind 8 0.542 0.528 0.433 0.411 0.621 0.528
Thailand ALL 0.180 0.162 0.122 0.481 0.588 0.352
Ind 0 0.579 0.561 0.689 0.629 0.551 0.620
Ind 2 0.184 0.186 0.254 0.222 0.205 0.209
Ind 5 0.551 0.463 0.487 0.506 0.513 0.534
Ind 6 0.293 0.298 0.256 0.287 0.363 0.326
Ind 7 0.138 0.127 0.086 0.513 0.604 0.346
Ind 8 0.295 0.309 0.216 0.164 0.423 0.287
Singapore ALL 0.608 0.594 0.542 0.560 0.706 0.637
Ind 0 0.560 0.595 0.510 0.532 0.572 0.584
Ind 2 0.074 0.079 0.098 0.100 0.080 0.089
Ind 5 0.370 0.366 0.315 0.296 0.317 0.350
Ind 6 0.209 0.234 0.352 0.352 0.357 0.306
Ind 7 0.657 0.630 0.586 0.575 0.719 0.664
Ind 8 0.246 0.377 0.356 0.365 0.427 0.397
Philippines ALL 0.164 0.164 0.079 0.084 0.237 0.153
Ind 0 0.358 0.222 0.255 0.351 0.252 0.292
Ind 2 0.773 0.766 0.711 0.733 0.746 0.768
Ind 5 0.635 0.613 0.468 0.452 0.499 0.554
Ind 6 0.395 0.461 0.560 0.550 0.574 0.534
Ind 7 0.161 0.164 0.077 0.077 0.233 0.149
Ind 8 0.269 0.364 0.317 0.403 0.453 0.367
Malaysia ALL 0.235 0.360 0.337 0.422 0.497 0.400
Ind 0 0.168 0.188 0.190 0.191 0.229 0.197
Ind 2 0.366 0.255 0.269 0.354 0.252 0.320
Ind 5 0.610 0.554 0.592 0.617 0.715 0.647
Ind 6 0.299 0.364 0.450 0.404 0.383 0.402
Ind 7 0.177 0.330 0.343 0.420 0.499 0.388
Ind 8 0.293 0.228 0.178 0.142 0.295 0.228
Indonesia ALL 0.140 0.142 0.130 0.142 0.160 0.164
Ind 0 0.231 0.194 0.162 0.206 0.136 0.202
Ind 2 0.325 0.318 0.389 0.420 0.462 0.397
Ind 3 0.097 0.144 0.754 0.725 0.749 0.770
Ind 5 0.537 0.524 0.463 0.491 0.533 0.544
Ind 6 0.416 0.486 0.578 0.536 0.571 0.554
Ind 7 0.121 0.121 0.087 0.122 0.119 0.134
Ind 8 0.193 0.239 0.106 0.127 0.343 0.220
Brunei ALL n.a 0.296 0.371 n.a n.a 0.283
Ind 0 n.a 0.573 0.483 n.a n.a 0.539
Ind 5 n.a 0.330 0.388 n.a n.a 0.390
Ind 6 n.a 0.492 0.562 n.a n.a 0.595
Ind 7 n.a 0.257 0.356 n.a n.a 0.263
Ind 8 n.a 0.528 0.440 n.a n.a 0.539
Table 4c: COS Measure for Korea's Exports
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Exports of 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Average
China ALL 0.169 0.153 0.128 0.172 0.242 0.181
Ind 0 0.245 0.295 0.223 0.330 0.326 0.297
Ind 2 0.119 0.124 0.097 0.100 0.089 0.107
Ind 3 0.932 0.899 0.717 0.582 0.460 0.742
Ind 4 0.686 0.172 0.175 0.069 0.076 0.268
Ind 5 0.380 0.385 0.384 0.415 0.418 0.405
Ind 6 0.402 0.444 0.351 0.352 0.386 0.396
Ind 7 0.240 0.225 0.174 0.232 0.304 0.247
Ind 8 0.176 0.196 0.156 0.179 0.188 0.187
Japan ALL 0.673 0.634 0.588 0.681 0.764 0.702
Ind 0 0.541 0.510 0.457 0.447 0.494 0.499
Ind 2 0.345 0.393 0.466 0.484 0.465 0.432
Ind 5 0.786 0.756 0.749 0.817 0.804 0.795
Ind 6 0.421 0.391 0.358 0.440 0.512 0.438
Ind 7 0.794 0.739 0.637 0.706 0.777 0.750
Ind 8 0.726 0.714 0.688 0.707 0.840 0.767
Thailand ALL 0.208 0.253 0.188 0.320 0.500 0.317
Ind 0 0.509 0.424 0.292 0.263 0.272 0.363
Ind 2 0.130 0.117 0.148 0.179 0.201 0.149
Ind 5 0.273 0.334 0.277 0.305 0.300 0.323
Ind 6 0.174 0.217 0.207 0.237 0.293 0.238
Ind 7 0.284 0.262 0.181 0.341 0.537 0.350
Ind 8 0.168 0.207 0.141 0.138 0.141 0.171
Singapore ALL 0.489 0.467 0.471 0.495 0.579 0.530
Ind 0 0.429 0.363 0.278 0.254 0.307 0.333
Ind 2 0.282 0.351 0.424 0.349 0.406 0.358
Ind 4 0.888 0.906 0.883 0.794 0.761 0.865
Ind 5 0.503 0.510 0.502 0.435 0.499 0.522
Ind 6 0.610 0.585 0.500 0.489 0.451 0.568
Ind 7 0.573 0.529 0.479 0.509 0.594 0.557
Ind 8 0.320 0.392 0.402 0.481 0.451 0.451
Philippines ALL 0.322 0.292 0.184 0.180 0.304 0.250
Ind 0 0.611 0.502 0.443 0.355 0.375 0.473
Ind 2 0.511 0.561 0.531 0.471 0.474 0.518
Ind 5 0.262 0.182 0.142 0.203 0.200 0.206
Ind 6 0.574 0.556 0.629 0.527 0.453 0.577
Ind 7 0.352 0.321 0.194 0.184 0.314 0.260
Ind 8 0.144 0.163 0.113 0.111 0.118 0.138
Malaysia ALL 0.159 0.271 0.214 0.448 0.573 0.376
Ind 0 0.281 0.267 0.225 0.224 0.254 0.265
Ind 2 0.254 0.215 0.176 0.206 0.177 0.212
Ind 4 0.910 0.917 0.896 0.752 0.776 0.863
Ind 5 0.410 0.365 0.389 0.487 0.443 0.442
Ind 6 0.314 0.299 0.228 0.256 0.271 0.284
Ind 7 0.184 0.329 0.249 0.482 0.594 0.419
Ind 8 0.146 0.173 0.136 0.146 0.183 0.166
Indonesia ALL 0.148 0.172 0.190 0.211 0.234 0.200
Ind 0 0.290 0.318 0.262 0.270 0.186 0.277
Ind 2 0.213 0.209 0.325 0.323 0.391 0.279
Ind 4 0.885 0.904 0.860 0.764 0.771 0.883
Ind 5 0.170 0.161 0.205 0.251 0.282 0.236
Ind 6 0.305 0.275 0.214 0.286 0.335 0.298
Ind 7 0.185 0.220 0.205 0.337 0.330 0.287
Ind 8 0.173 0.195 0.060 0.120 0.137 0.154
Brunei ALL n.a 0.400 0.528 n.a n.a 0.404
Table 4d: COS Measure for Korea's Imports
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Imports of 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Average
Japan ALL 0.387 0.389 0.439 0.452 0.458 0.437
Ind 0 0.525 0.570 0.471 0.498 0.527 0.534
Ind 2 0.333 0.335 0.317 0.296 0.283 0.317
Ind 3 0.800 0.742 0.809 0.649 0.580 0.724
Ind 4 0.558 0.175 0.182 0.055 0.104 0.267
Ind 5 0.532 0.489 0.503 0.468 0.469 0.500
Ind 6 0.276 0.316 0.365 0.317 0.301 0.324
Ind 7 0.434 0.497 0.575 0.565 0.531 0.540
Ind 8 0.627 0.613 0.603 0.617 0.629 0.626
Thailand ALL 0.311 0.330 0.334 0.370 0.426 0.387
Ind 0 0.167 0.170 0.177 0.228 0.295 0.209
Ind 2 0.085 0.100 0.090 0.072 0.070 0.084
Ind 3 0.888 0.847 0.694 0.775 0.537 0.835
Ind 5 0.332 0.373 0.357 0.372 0.402 0.386
Ind 6 0.356 0.380 0.342 0.353 0.433 0.389
Ind 7 0.465 0.506 0.477 0.507 0.527 0.539
Ind 8 0.317 0.338 0.324 0.336 0.402 0.352
Indonesia ALL 0.211 0.216 0.207 0.170 0.175 0.223
Ind 0 0.192 0.187 0.683 0.519 0.301 0.436
Ind2 0.281 0.204 0.153 0.160 0.105 0.193
Ind 3 0.248 0.345 0.320 0.494 0.364 0.347
Ind 4 0.785 0.340 0.830 0.707 0.632 0.571
Ind 5 0.328 0.344 0.319 0.253 0.248 0.324
Ind 6 0.374 0.428 0.432 0.396 0.456 0.445
Ind 7 0.253 0.243 0.174 0.187 0.163 0.238
Ind 8 0.200 0.319 0.174 0.279 0.360 0.295
Philippines ALL 0.168 0.172 0.210 0.181 0.245 0.203
Ind 0 0.166 0.241 0.677 0.491 0.324 0.420
Ind 2 0.210 0.191 0.180 0.176 0.191 0.198
Ind 5 0.321 0.340 0.363 0.383 0.398 0.378
Ind 6 0.462 0.508 0.528 0.441 0.511 0.508
Ind 7 0.263 0.281 0.316 0.256 0.314 0.295
Ind 8 0.278 0.344 0.290 0.360 0.350 0.334
Malaysia ALL 0.199 0.218 0.208 0.223 0.268 0.239
Ind 0 0.164 0.257 0.450 0.363 0.317 0.316
Ind 2 0.242 0.219 0.208 0.196 0.138 0.211
Ind 4 0.271 0.432 0.342 0.588 0.620 0.524
Ind 5 0.447 0.452 0.406 0.399 0.401 0.438
Ind 6 0.378 0.364 0.358 0.349 0.407 0.388
Ind 7 0.344 0.380 0.326 0.326 0.348 0.361
Ind 8 0.270 0.213 0.213 0.236 0.227 0.236
Singapore ALL 0.289 0.316 0.351 0.386 0.409 0.371
Ind 0 0.472 0.519 0.593 0.550 0.514 0.556
Ind 2 0.189 0.184 0.151 0.164 0.106 0.165
Ind 4 0.646 0.259 0.313 0.133 0.150 0.380
Ind 5 0.344 0.328 0.332 0.354 0.368 0.361
Ind 6 0.401 0.431 0.451 0.476 0.523 0.473
Ind 7 0.506 0.567 0.575 0.582 0.549 0.579
Ind 8 0.273 0.284 0.256 0.294 0.310 0.302
Brunei ALL n.a. 0.284 0.270 n.a. n.a. 0.308
Ind 0 n.a. 0.540 0.299 n.a. n.a. 0.611
Ind 5 n.a. 0.461 0.574 n.a. n.a. 0.537
Ind 6 n.a. 0.452 0.437 n.a. n.a. 0.477
Ind 7 n.a. 0.282 0.233 n.a. n.a. 0.272
Ind 8 n.a. 0.478 0.530 n.a. n.a. 0.545
Table 4e: COS Measure for China's Exports
   32
Exports of 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Average
Japan ALL 0.475 0.545 0.578 0.615 0.657 0.614
Ind 0 0.158 0.134 0.176 0.192 0.203 0.186
Ind 2 0.609 0.585 0.602 0.463 0.440 0.537
Ind 5 0.392 0.423 0.419 0.508 0.568 0.493
Ind 6 0.452 0.452 0.482 0.543 0.547 0.520
Ind 7 0.545 0.642 0.650 0.672 0.701 0.679
Ind 8 0.502 0.458 0.541 0.548 0.615 0.561
Thailand ALL 0.354 0.470 0.538 0.517 0.574 0.525
Ind 0 0.440 0.275 0.389 0.300 0.312 0.352
Ind 2 0.438 0.304 0.315 0.271 0.308 0.326
Ind 5 0.418 0.594 0.705 0.737 0.755 0.733
Ind 6 0.215 0.323 0.346 0.351 0.384 0.339
Ind 7 0.499 0.643 0.660 0.606 0.645 0.644
Ind 8 0.160 0.167 0.170 0.177 0.176 0.178
Indonesia ALL 0.125 0.174 0.227 0.267 0.319 0.226
Ind 0 0.097 0.087 0.163 0.131 0.166 0.136
Ind 2 0.159 0.146 0.244 0.267 0.342 0.234
Ind 4 0.360 0.534 0.595 0.764 0.737 0.614
Ind 5 0.517 0.366 0.337 0.379 0.415 0.389
Ind 6 0.132 0.144 0.225 0.231 0.273 0.192
Ind 7 0.272 0.458 0.571 0.617 0.588 0.559
Ind 8 0.068 0.069 0.048 0.075 0.088 0.077
Philippines ALL 0.180 0.215 0.166 0.148 0.226 0.191
Ind 0 0.648 0.585 0.597 0.386 0.511 0.584
Ind 2 0.405 0.489 0.526 0.424 0.496 0.458
Ind 5 0.223 0.303 0.262 0.248 0.211 0.268
Ind 6 0.281 0.284 0.342 0.394 0.480 0.385
Ind 7 0.199 0.248 0.185 0.161 0.239 0.209
Ind 8 0.121 0.121 0.126 0.138 0.122 0.131
Malaysia ALL 0.317 0.438 0.508 0.606 0.662 0.569
Ind 0 0.102 0.063 0.105 0.221 0.258 0.164
Ind 2 0.355 0.396 0.398 0.579 0.501 0.455
Ind 4 0.472 0.513 0.689 0.829 0.956 0.693
Ind 5 0.524 0.445 0.432 0.485 0.605 0.540
Ind 6 0.155 0.214 0.268 0.238 0.271 0.227
Ind 7 0.376 0.548 0.621 0.692 0.729 0.666
Ind 8 0.157 0.160 0.144 0.162 0.211 0.174
Singapore ALL 0.436 0.578 0.668 0.722 0.780 0.687
Ind 0 0.128 0.069 0.068 0.172 0.191 0.136
Ind 2 0.385 0.372 0.502 0.352 0.462 0.421
Ind 4 0.475 0.549 0.661 0.801 0.846 0.676
Ind 5 0.374 0.467 0.500 0.367 0.516 0.488
Ind 6 0.371 0.339 0.378 0.432 0.485 0.438
Ind 7 0.521 0.716 0.781 0.821 0.863 0.792
Ind 8 0.311 0.304 0.331 0.485 0.534 0.423
Brunei ALL n.a. 0.145 0.170 n.a. n.a. 0.138
Table 4f: COS Measure for China's Imports
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Imports from 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Average
Thailand ALL 0.523 0.518 0.430 0.598 0.620 0.580
Ind 0 0.387 0.512 0.540 0.414 0.391 0.452
Ind 2 0.491 0.452 0.417 0.539 0.472 0.502
Ind 5 0.716 0.674 0.665 0.744 0.736 0.736
Ind 6 0.512 0.509 0.388 0.454 0.615 0.520
Ind 7 0.540 0.529 0.446 0.641 0.637 0.602
Ind 8 0.401 0.377 0.321 0.284 0.268 0.334
Indonesia ALL 0.346 0.361 0.241 0.203 0.282 0.339
Ind 0 0.110 0.265 0.114 0.074 0.266 0.142
Ind 2 0.680 0.678 0.572 0.475 0.465 0.602
Ind 5 0.670 0.636 0.563 0.492 0.523 0.602
Ind 6 0.509 0.523 0.562 0.506 0.562 0.565
Ind 7 0.379 0.369 0.319 0.367 0.317 0.389
Ind 8 0.487 0.487 0.417 0.334 0.281 0.452
Philippines ALL 0.371 0.373 0.321 0.249 0.308 0.323
Ind 0 0.164 0.266 0.161 0.299 0.398 0.234
Ind 2 0.290 0.256 0.263 0.288 0.320 0.286
Ind 5 0.497 0.537 0.559 0.637 0.630 0.589
Ind 6 0.372 0.384 0.419 0.476 0.500 0.440
Ind 7 0.372 0.376 0.325 0.248 0.309 0.324
Ind 8 0.402 0.398 0.371 0.376 0.385 0.395
Malaysia ALL 0.406 0.519 0.455 0.472 0.528 0.494
Ind 0 0.342 0.325 0.293 0.373 0.414 0.355
Ind 2 0.395 0.480 0.455 0.516 0.600 0.538
Ind 5 0.670 0.652 0.669 0.725 0.757 0.722
Ind 6 0.586 0.624 0.662 0.674 0.672 0.676
Ind 7 0.410 0.525 0.457 0.477 0.535 0.497
Ind 8 0.556 0.505 0.428 0.415 0.407 0.477
Singapore ALL 0.782 0.759 0.719 0.678 0.710 0.738
Ind 0 0.624 0.667 0.612 0.617 0.657 0.650
Ind 2 0.243 0.278 0.258 0.350 0.380 0.309
Ind 5 0.601 0.593 0.589 0.642 0.627 0.635
Ind 6 0.496 0.478 0.537 0.512 0.499 0.522
Ind 7 0.798 0.774 0.732 0.690 0.726 0.750
Ind 8 0.411 0.450 0.451 0.483 0.483 0.473
Brunei ALL n.a. 0.256 0.247 n.a. n.a. 0.271
Ind 0 n.a. 0.391 0.497 n.a. n.a. 0.499
Ind 5 n.a. 0.487 0.601 n.a. n.a. 0.571
Ind 6 n.a. 0.434 0.469 n.a. n.a. 0.490
Ind 7 n.a. 0.271 0.266 n.a. n.a. 0.290
Ind 8 n.a. 0.249 0.351 n.a. n.a. 0.317
Table 4g: COS Measure for Japan's Exports
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Exports from 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Average
Thailand ALL 0.519 0.573 0.607 0.636 0.704 0.625
Ind 0 0.457 0.484 0.480 0.432 0.495 0.472
Ind 2 0.347 0.305 0.235 0.241 0.257 0.279
Ind 4 0.425 0.197 0.204 0.244 0.478 0.316
Ind 5 0.330 0.317 0.301 0.279 0.221 0.297
Ind 6 0.505 0.369 0.313 0.372 0.350 0.401
Ind 7 0.611 0.654 0.685 0.708 0.761 0.701
Ind 8 0.570 0.528 0.504 0.501 0.512 0.534
Indonesia ALL 0.350 0.411 0.436 0.457 0.422 0.425
Ind 0 0.634 0.718 0.718 0.632 0.649 0.676
Ind 2 0.152 0.181 0.232 0.240 0.332 0.220
Ind 4 0.553 0.670 0.780 0.868 0.688 0.754
Ind 5 0.155 0.153 0.211 0.230 0.233 0.208
Ind 6 0.579 0.552 0.420 0.513 0.489 0.527
Ind 7 0.367 0.524 0.616 0.676 0.548 0.584
Ind 8 0.386 0.404 0.354 0.373 0.390 0.421
Philippines ALL 0.429 0.359 0.230 0.204 0.310 0.282
Ind 0 0.557 0.548 0.589 0.592 0.648 0.593
Ind 2 0.623 0.662 0.671 0.652 0.626 0.656
Ind 5 0.382 0.297 0.252 0.330 0.278 0.321
Ind 6 0.292 0.253 0.214 0.209 0.201 0.244
Ind 7 0.474 0.408 0.256 0.225 0.337 0.311
Ind 8 0.477 0.497 0.498 0.471 0.504 0.500
Malaysia ALL 0.355 0.477 0.488 0.668 0.724 0.591
Ind 0 0.411 0.454 0.512 0.492 0.552 0.502
Ind 2 0.319 0.349 0.213 0.268 0.243 0.288
Ind 4 0.929 0.919 0.938 0.934 0.909 0.932
Ind 5 0.338 0.329 0.345 0.329 0.309 0.339
Ind 6 0.489 0.486 0.363 0.479 0.423 0.457
Ind 7 0.406 0.582 0.613 0.788 0.801 0.701
Ind 8 0.365 0.374 0.346 0.375 0.443 0.388
Singapore ALL 0.677 0.652 0.689 0.675 0.669 0.682
Ind 0 0.516 0.446 0.415 0.350 0.375 0.431
Ind 2 0.317 0.386 0.554 0.380 0.364 0.402
Ind 3 0.517 0.042 0.414 0.387 0.406 0.432
Ind 4 0.912 0.936 0.915 0.931 0.885 0.927
Ind 5 0.443 0.429 0.464 0.418 0.465 0.487
Ind 6 0.486 0.426 0.370 0.377 0.428 0.437
Ind 7 0.821 0.808 0.821 0.785 0.740 0.795
Ind 8 0.554 0.552 0.508 0.469 0.425 0.542
Brunei ALL n.a. 0.202 0.350 n.a. n.a. 0.307
Table 4h: COS Measure for Japan's Imports
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Thailand Korea Malaysia Indonesia Japan Laos Phillippines Singapore China India Vietnam Myanmar
Thailand 1
Korea 0.823 1
Malaysia 0.724 0.643 1
Indonesia 0.807 0.857 0.862 1
Japan 0.374 0.536 0.276 0.436 1
Laos 0.180 0.158 0.409 0.479 0.058 1
Phillippines 0.403 0.419 0.339 0.359 0.242 -0.178 1
Singapore 0.555 0.503 0.795 0.623 0.161 0.129 0.381 1
China 0.094 0.055 0.093 0.120 0.155 0.118 -0.447 -0.158 1
India 0.165 0.070 0.049 0.004 0.332 -0.298 0.467 0.131 -0.134 1
Vietnam -0.002 0.151 0.125 0.188 -0.172 0.052 0.056 -0.031 0.257 -0.100 1
Myanmar -0.291 -0.563 -0.150 -0.278 -0.568 0.333 -0.261 -0.326 0.111 -0.131 -0.126 1




India Indonesia Korea Malaysia Myanmar Vietnam Thailand Singapore Phillippines China Japan Laos
India 1
Indonesia 0.603 1
Korea 0.332 0.008 1
Malaysia 0.333 -0.137 0.467 1
Myanmar 0.439 0.429 0.019 -0.003 1
Vietnam 0.112 -0.075 0.226 0.348 0.073 1
Thailand 0.171 0.034 0.456 0.019 0.037 -0.216 1
Singapore -0.147 0.008 0.077 0.158 -0.312 0.042 -0.288 1
Phillippines -0.205 0.174 -0.161 -0.052 -0.167 0.142 -0.371 0.276 1
China -0.052 0.130 -0.021 -0.237 0.256 -0.204 0.436 -0.067 0.243 1
Japan -0.373 -0.140 -0.256 -0.661 -0.017 -0.320 -0.056 -0.091 0.375 0.282 1
Laos -0.263 -0.610 -0.180 0.191 -0.087 -0.088 -0.071 -0.419 -0.192 -0.188 -0.170 1
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Size Adjustment Size Adjustment
Myanmar 0.059 0.748 0.069 0.602
China 0.042 0.892 0.047 0.900
India 0.025 1.080 0.040 1.256
Indonesia 0.055 0.910 0.337 0.503
Japan 0.142 0.275 0.023 0.451
Korea 0.041 0.865 0.033 0.433
Laos 0.030 1.162 0.268 0.885
Malaysia 0.038 1.103 0.023 0.945
Phillippines 0.053 0.782 0.056 0.972
Singapore 0.057 0.862 0.039 1.263
Thailand 0.059 0.884 0.039 0.995
Vietnam 0.054 0.744 0.259 0.376
Averages for Different Geographic Regions
ASEAN + 4 0.055 0.859 0.103 0.798
W. Europe 1/ 0.030 0.684 0.022 0.417
Americas 1/ 0.062 0.801 0.145 0.820
SAARC 2/ 0.023 0.826 0.037 1.106
1/ Figures are from Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994)
2/ Figures are from Saxena (2005)
Table 6: Disturbances and Adjustments across Different
Geographic Regions
Supply Disturbance Demand Disturbance
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EU NAFTA Asia
Austria 0.96 Mexico 0.99 China 0.72
Belgium 1.81 Canada 1.57 Indonesia 0.99
Denmark 1.72 United States 1.54 Japan 0.81
Finland 4.60 Average1 . 3 7 Korea 1.36
France 1.75 Malaysia 1.97
Germany 1.24 Philippines 1.61
Iceland 1.73 Singapore 1.11
Ireland 3.65 Thailand 1.25
Italy 1.34 Average1 . 2 3
Luxembourg 0.78
Norway 1.39 SAARC
Portugal 1.52 Pakistan 1.18
Spain 3.36 Sri Lanka 2.52
Sweden 3.06 Average1 . 8 5
United Kingdom 2.02
Average2 . 0 6
Data souce is World Development Indicators CD-Rom, World Bank, 2002.
Data for all countries is from 1980-2000, except for Germany (1991-2000), Sri Lanka
(1990-2000), Mexico (1988-99) and Indonesia (1996-2000).  
Table 7: Dispersion of Unemployment Rate Across Regions
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Figure 1: Intra-ASEAN Trade (as a % of total trade)
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Figure 2: Share of Trade with ASEAN: China, Korea, Japan and India 
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